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 LOOKING FROM WITHIN. 
ON THE CONCEPT OF NEURONAL AESTHETICS 
Olaf BREIDBACH 
 The idea of ‘looking from within’ aims at a new type of neuronal 
aesthetics. Following that idea I try to envisage a new phenomenology, 
which does not divide nature and culture into two fields, and apprehends 
them separately nor reduces one side to the other. On the other hand it is 
no good to redo any kind of monism, relaunching ideas from about 1900; 
nevertheless we have to start with the notion that in viewing our 
environment we orient ourselves on the specific properties of our senses 
and our brain. We do that in the way, we have been trained in our culture. 
We find that these properties are modified according to our culture, 
which not only orients our minds but already directs our brain activity. 
Neural activity, thus, is not merely an effect of evolution, it likewise 
reflects a culture, and it should be interpreted in this twofold sense as a 
unity. To achieve that, we do need an integrative phenomenology that 
will again connect our experience to our corporeality, while at the same 
time conceiving the body as embedded in its culture and, therefore, in a 
history, that points beyond mere nature.  
Thus, neuronal aesthetics is not just neuro-aesthetics in the sense 
that I have to look into the brain to understand what it perceives. In the 
contrary, the analysis of the neuronal program of perception show, that 
we have to interpret the basic settings of our perceptions to get an idea 
how we actually perform our behaviour. My thesis is that representations 
are not put into the observer, but are formed by him. They are formed to 
fit into internal predispositions.1  
Just to give you form the start an impression on what I am to speak 
about. What do we actually see, in looking on a chair? David Hockney 
                                                                   
1 These ideas are worked out in more detail in Breidbach (2013); here, likewise, the 
relevant literature is cited. 
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made us see what we actually look on.2 He uses some polaroid camera 
with a narrow focus. To get a view of something, he, thus, had to made a 
whole series of pictures, he afterward put together. In such a way he 
actually mimics what is happening when we look on something, scanning 
it up by eye tracking and combining the series of views; than results in 
something to be perceived by our brain. As you see, a chair actually is 
perceived as something much different from we actually expect to see. 
We actually never perceive parallels, or right angles, but we do make us 
see such ones. The impact of geometry is a cultural impact leading back to 
our handling of landscapes and complex forms by certain technical 
means, the angle metre and the velum. Our image of the world is a 
construction due to training, our cultural interpretation of our world and 
the specific needs and functions of our perceiving organ, the brain. 
Philosophically that means, we could look on what we see according to 
our way to handle and to interpret those thinks that were perceived. 
These are not simply informations implemented into our mind. Thus, we 
do not simply mirror nature, but form out representations according to 
our means. Already within sensualism that was not thought about as a 
second world being implemented within the observers head, but a 
reproduction of what has been received according to the needs and 
possibilities of the perceiving mind. 
 
The perceiving mind is not an abstract faculty, however, but 
something, working in and by the brain (Roth 2003). Accordingly, 
perception could be performed only according the capabilities of such a 
system – including the sensory organs and their specificities. Historically, 
such an idea was already substantiated before the actual functional 
organisation of brain tissue was clarified.  
 
The principle idea about brain functionality was formed out in the 
start of the 19th century.3 It was the idea by which James Mill tried to 
understand the principal functional organisation of the brain. And that 
was delivered from associative psychology. He thought the brain was 
designed like a network of strings. A sensory input pulls on certain of 
these strings. As all of these were in close contact a certain activation 
resulted in a whole concert of vibrations within a brain. If two or more 
stimuli were reacted on simultaneously, such a concert would be more 
complex and might result in a specific coupling of various such string 
resonances. Thus, activation modes with such a system and by that the 
stimuli represented in it became associated. This idea was outlined 
                                                                   
2 In his polaroid series. 
3 For details see: Finger 1994; Hagner 1997; Breidbach 2001: 7-29. 
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before neuroanatomy had identified the neuron and its functional 
connectivity patterns. Nevertheless this model formed the way by which 
neurobiologists started to think about brain functions and brain activity. 
From the start onwards, thus, the brain was looked upon as a kind of 
associative system. Mill, himself, had adopted the former Hartlean 
scheme, saying there is a certain pathway within the brain that is 
stimulated by a certain sensory input.4 Another sensory experience may 
stimulate another pathway. The closer these are associated, the more 
similar these experiences will appear.  
 
Accordingly, there must be a mechanism to detect such functional 
distances in the signal propagation in the brain. Mill’s idea was, that such 
stimuli may overlay. Thus classification would be simple: the more 
extended the overlay is, the more similar the stimuli are. It is easy to 
construct a putative mechanism that may work within the brain to do this 
calculation. When neuroantomy identified a cellular network of 
interwoven neurons, the functional units in which such associations 
could be dealt with, seemed to have been identified. This concept was 
worked on till the end of 19th century and reinstalled again by Hebb in the 
1950ies; it became effective a third time in the late 1980ies, and is still 
followed on more or less in the principal design formed out by Mill nearly 
two centuries, ago.  
 
This is something to think about, as it shows us that our concepts 
according to which we are interpreting mind functions are older than our 
ideas about brain tissue functionality. Eventually, we may come back to 
this. Irrespectively from, how the functionality of an associative mind is 
formed out, the principle message is clear. If the brain is the organ by 
which we perceive, its physiology determined how we do this. And, 
therein we should follow any idea up to its consequences. Thereby, 
interestingly, we have to admit, that most of our knowledge on brain 
representation and arts and ordering functions is due to optical sensory 
input.  
 
Yet, there is wonderful material about the way an owl perceives its 
prey or a bat approaches a moth. And we do know something about how 
to perceive music and how we understand the subtle messages delivered 
within auditory communication. How fascinating it is to go into much 
detail, here, might become pretty clear already from everyday life. There 
is a person, you know very well attempting to call you up by phone. The 
signal is digitised in the microphone and transferred via satellite to your 
                                                                   
4 The background is outlined in more detail in Breidbach 2007: 23-33. 
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own phone where it is reorganized to form out something audible, 
Nevertheless, in spite of such dreadful dissection and resetting of 
auditory signals your might be able to understand emotions put into the 
words delivered. There is something we can take hold of, even if the 
signals are incomplete or suppressed by a random noise. We do know 
what we might have gotten and put the signals we noted into the framing 
of our expectations to get something we actually work on (blind spot) 
(Bexte 1999). 
 
The mind is able to make the incomplete signal understandable by 
adding on memory projections and expectations to the signals actually 
registered. Thus far, the operating mind is no simple association device. 
Yet there is not only association (Jamme, Jeck 2013). Naturally, we have 
to admit, there are certain centres, needed for certain functions. The 
brain is an associative device wherein the signals path certain pathways 
coming from certain sensory input regions, being delivered according to 
those lines of neurons that have precisely defined functions. These ones 
have been evolved in mammalian brain evolution. Interestingly, however, 
already at the first step of such transfer pathways signal were dispersed 
into a whole network of neurons and receive input by the same network. 
That starts within the eye already where in humans the number of 
incoming fibres from the brain even surpasses the projecting fibres to the 
brain. This is going on in the next steps of signal transfer. Thus far, the 
visual cortex, the cortex area where the sensory information of the eye is 
transferred to before dispersing to the frontal cortex, the region 
associated with the highest brain functions, is already overlaid to a lot of 
parallel stimulations. Even before some information comes in there, is 
some general arousal within that region, eventually due to input into this 
system done before, which is reimplemented in that area within a certain 
time period. One can speculate a lot on this, but interestingly a model 
showing such features might demonstrate the very easy tricks of such a 
complex intermingling of connectivity patterns. As the model shows us, 
this is a basal feature (Zeki 1993). Thus, it is the principal functional 
characteristic of real neuronal networks, that is the brain tissue 
organisation. Accordingly, interchange is one of the central 
characteristics of data transfer within the brain. 
 
That comes quite close to an other traditional concept, most popular 
in the Anglo-American world but quite unknown in the German tradition. 
It is the concept of dissolution as been put forward by Hughlings 
Jacksonalready in last part of the 19th century. Due to the evidence of 
clinical studies he proposed, that the specificity of human mind is not the 
concentration of strict lines of internal references but the complex 
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intermingling of various pathways to squeeze as much of surplus 
information as possible within the signal transfer of a brain.  
Consequently the old idea of separation of faculties – which is already 
a problem when describing the higher orders of visual integration – is not 
to be taken as a general scheme to understand brain function. 
 
Furthermore there is a different concept of memory traces that get 
rid of the idea of storage areas for memories and is working with a much 
more flexible idea of sorting out and conserving neuronal input. We have 
to look for such alternatives, describing quite closely what the ideas and 
metaphors are, that were effective in such models. And this bears massive 
consequences for our idea about internal representations. In my view it is 
high time to end up with the Aristotelian scheme separating sensory, 
associative and memory formation areas and functions. When integrating 
such various viewpoints, the brain might get some different meaning. 
 
There is no theatre of brain performances. The system is acting as an 
entity. It has no screen where something is going to look at, but is to 
describe as a complex interacting unit even combining periphery and 
central projection sites. Furthermore the network, in which this is 
performed, is no fixed site – it is not a kind of spider network to catch 
certain activities in, but is a dynamic system fixed only by a neuro-
anatomist. While being alive it is in continuous evolution. The highly 
complex grid of interacting elements, thus, is to describe in such a 
complex multimodal interaction describing co-activations between 
interacting neurons that result in a very complex response, that 
nevertheless can be traced down to some basic functionality. 
 
A simple calculus may describe the relation of activations employed 
by such stimuli. That can be done employing some mathematics. Thus, 
one may succeed to describe the functions of neuronal networks that 
eventually even have a natural correspondence. We can distinguish 
different signal inputs by describing the overlay in their internal stimuli 
characteristics (Breidbach 1993; Braitenberg, Schüz 1998). That can be 
done in a more sophisticated way, and one does not have to work with 
the idea of an explicit overlay of fixed grids with elements that are 
coupled in a fixed way to defined input elements but just look on different 
overall activity patterns in a non-hierarchically organized network. 
 
Thus, a relative distance matrix can be described where the relation 
of each element to any other element is determined. The description of 
these relations allows unfolding homologous similarities in stimulus 
response characteristics depending on the actual hardware 
implementation of the neuronal connectivity in such a network. Any 
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signal can be classified regarding to initiated changes in that general 
activation modes. These might be effective for some short times forming 
out certain trajectories that may change the system activity pattern in 
general eliciting new attractors of valid energy patterns. Thus, we can 
demonstrate what internal representation means. 
 
There the basic mechanism is a simple one, as the system will just 
look for differences to something that is implemented within itself. But 
already this description shows that the categorisation of signals may 
work in reference to a grid of network stimulations. This gives a matrix, 
in which every element is described by its putative contacts to any other 
element. If we knew every possible combination of elements in such a 
grid of interaction, that is, if we could describe the complete set of 
putative matrices employable by the system, we would find something 
that resembles the basic grammar of the system. This would allow us to 
get some meaning into the functional syntax. That idea should be outlined 
in much more detail: 
 
Following the concept of internal representations, signal processing in 
a neuronal system has to be evaluated exclusively on the basis of internal 
system characteristics (Breidbach 2007: 23-33). Thus, this approach 
omits the external observer as a control function for sensory integration. 
Instead, the configuration of the system and its computational 
performance are the effects of endogenous factors. Such self-referential 
operation is due to a strictly local computation in a network. Thereby, 
computations follow a set of rules that constitutes the emergent 
behaviour of the system. Because these rules can be demonstrated to 
correspond to a "logic" that is intrinsic to the system. This idea provides 
the basis for something we call neuro-semantics (Breidbach 200: 353-
363; Breidbach 1999: 34-60). This I cannot discuss in detail here. The 
principal idea is that the distance matrix formed allows a kind of 
differential distance calculus which allows setting apart certain signal 
configuration according to their resemblance  
 
How far such a concept could be extended to give an idea for the 
much more differentiated scheme of picture analysis or, eventually, even 
the ideas about categorizations, which is essential to understand how we 
discern an image and the things been represented by it? Here a closer 
view on brain organisation and especially the inherent dynamics of 
human brain development may be helpful. Yet, where culture comes in? 
Before giving an answer to that, let me outline the contour of another 
story, told by developmental neurosciences. 
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In human ontogenesis the numerically most extended brain – in 
regard to cell numbers or the amount of cell-cell contacts – is not 
achieved in the end of ones life span, but is established within the 
embryo. There is an overproduction, the cells form contacts sites and 
establish certain preliminary neuronal networks. Those cells that did 
succeed in forming out such contact sites were preserved, those that did 
not declined (Katz, Shatz 1996: 1133-1138; Catalanom, Shatz 1998: 559-
562; Majdan, Shatz 2006: 650-659). Accordingly, a huge number of 
neurons degenerated. Thereafter, synapses are formed. Hereby, within a 
network of preliminary contact sites, those that are functionally relevant 
were sorted out. Contact sites used were preserved, those that did not 
diminish. Accordingly, within months, the number of contact sites is 
declined in the postembryonic human brain.  
 
What is the meaning of that? The overproduction of neurons in early 
ontogenesis allows a reshaping of neuronal networks due to 
functionality. Thereby the brain can be used in different situations, and 
nevertheless – using the same program of development – results in 
optimal adaptations. Following that strategy, the functional units of the 
brain, the neurons in their development have not to look for 
predetermined sites in which predetermined contacts could be framed 
out, thus establishing brain functionality according to a fixed blueprint. 
On the contrary, that overproduction of putative connection sites allows 
some flexibility in brain design. As functionality sorts out those parts 
needed in an overproduction of putative contact sites the brain is able to 
response to changes in the environments the young animal is going to life 
in instantaneously during development. Following such a strategy 
functional contacts could be achieved according to functional needs: 
Tissue parts that were not used are melted down in ongoing 
development.  
 
That overproduction of neurons in the embryonic brain of hominoids 
turns out to allow an evolutionary strategy that might be specific for the 
human species. The strategy is, to externalize memory functions. and 
here, culture come in. This is done by establishing and maintaining a 
specific surrounding, to which the brain is adapted to (by cutting down 
functional connectivity patterns from an extended offer of putative 
contact sits and putative integrative units (the neurons)). As this 
functional adjustment of neuronal connectivity patterns is driven by the 
sensory input, it is somehow equalizing brain response characteristics in 
those brains that were exposed to similar sensory input situations: all 
brains “reared up” in a similar way show an adjustment of neuronal 
functionalities (Young, Lawlor, Leone, Dragunow, During 1999; Rushton 
2001). Thus far, to adapt to new types of experiences within such a group 
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with common experiences, it is not necessary to alter a pre-determined 
wiring pattern in brain tissue. Thus far, there is no need to form out 
specific physiological mechanism or/and new genes that had to be 
stabilized within a population. Such a reaction might allow reacting 
properly, but it costs time to go on in such a way, as such a reaction works 
only over a long lasting series of generations. Cultural development, 
however, is much faster.  
 
Consequently, evolution of behavioural schemes can be done in a 
small time scale, as there is no need to form out genes that may direct the 
anlage of a completely new reaction specific neuronal pathway. What 
evolution offers so far is some stuff to deal with and not some prefixed 
form to stick to in the developing brain: When been used in early life, 
within that offer putative contact sites are stabilized. Thus, the individual 
that forms out his brain is adapting to its sensory input situation. If that 
situation is stabilized by the group it grows up in, the next generation, 
even that one will adapt to this. Eventually, thereafter, it will secure the 
same environment for its offspring, stabilizing the way it used to sort out 
things in experience and behaviour. If this is done in parallel in a group of 
individuals, this group will form out a common scheme to which their 
members are allowed to react to and to react with. Thus far, new 
behavioural features like dispositions to deal with more and more 
complex sensory input situations, certain improvements in the fine 
tuning of motor pattern (skills) or eventually the scheme by which 
communication signals are formed and understood within such a group 
can be predetermined. Thus, these were inherited not by forming out 
new sites of gene expressions, but by exposition of certain sensory 
experiences in early lifetime.  
 
Such standards, however, have to be formed out and maintained 
within the changing pattern of natural objects seen, smelt, heard or dealt 
with in or by such a group. Thus, it is not simply sitting at a certain place, 
which allows man to go on in such an evolution. What is needed for the 
developing brain is a kind of scheme within a complex situation of 
putative sensory input sites: Something that is stabilising a brain which in 
parallel is exposed to a most complex sensory world. By providing such a 
scheme, something like a first matrix is provided in the organisation of 
input sites. If such a grid is established in those parts of the brain that 
deals with incoming information, that one is able to sort out finer 
patterns within such a grid and thus, gradually, evolves a more and more 
refined response characteristic. In such a way, at least, information 
processing of different individuals within one such group can be 
parallelized and, thus, coordinated in such a group. The way to do that is 
living together, share experiences and in a second stance: language. 
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Language is an externalized memory of order characteristics into 
which group experiences should be implemented in. What language does, 
is to sort out and conserve common references (Breidbach 2011: 121-
155). Thus far, a certain reference to some term can be shared via 
narratives. Accordingly, group experiences can be parallelized even in the 
absence of the reference sites represented by certain elements of such a 
language. Thus far cultural evolution indirectly produces something like 
an continuous overlay over brain activities and developments in a certain 
group. I am a bit simplistic here, but eventually that gives you an idea of 
the general scheme behind. 
 
The nervous tissue will give that material the later worked at, 
however it is not as simple, that cultural evolution is nothing but the 
outcome of an adaptation of brain tissue and brain physiology, whose 
behaviour in its more complicated form has to be described as evolved 
frame of brain activation patterns. The simplistic idea of neuro-aesthetics 
as it has been put forward by Semor Zeki or –in a more carton-like form 
in modern sociobiology by E. Volandt and K. Grammer for example might 
allow to propose something like this (Zeki, Lamb 1994; Zeki 2002; 
Voland, Grammer 2003). However – these shortcomings fail to describe 
more than certain identification of subpatterns of sensory 
representations in the brain. It is the same story once told me by the late 
Otto Creutzfeld, who had to test the functionality of certain human brain 
areas during operations. To do this, he had to be quick, and as he looked 
for frequency representations, he did not bother the people by presenting 
a long series of sounds of different frequencies but played of two short 
pieces of music, both showing much different frequency spectra. The one 
was played by a classical chamber orchestra the other one by a jazz 
combo. As suspected, he was able to identify certain sets of neurons who 
were sensitive to different frequencies of sound spectra. Only a shortcut 
would produce the newspaper headline thereafter: Creutzfeld detected 
classical music centre in brain set apart from the localization of jazz 
music propagation.  
 
Accordingly, to make the point of internal representation clear, it is 
not that we have just to look into the brain to understand how 
representations are done. The situation is much more complicated. We 
have to study the rules of internal activation modes, describe what it 
meant to from a differential calculus for identification of signals. 
Representations were not stored away but handled on within an 
associative brain. Experiences show us where we can point to something 
different, not known till now. Experience even allows us to put such new 
things close to something already known and set apart to other things 
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and situations. The way to do is due to the internal mode of propagation. 
What is to be seen is according to that mode. 
 
There is no “red” which could be transported via the signal cascade 
from our sensory cells towards the brain.5 The quality “red” occurs in the 
brain area activated by the incoming signal. There, the impression of red 
becomes a quality, as every input is put together to a coherent word 
image within that brain. Hereby memory is combined to sensor. So we 
might understand how far y input. It is the Aristotelian phantasia that 
makes the world view a coherent one, into which new inputs could be 
integrated, thereafter. However, these are no distinct centres but it is the 
underlying dynamics of network organisation that made such coherence 
of representation feasible. There are weighting functions by which any 
step in parallel-processing of information is stabilized and made 
discernable in the general arousal of network activation.  
 
It is a complex dynamic we had to enface; yet in this dynamic 
distance function became stabilized, there are positions and horizons that 
become discernable. There is a complex of putative imaginations into 
which actual images might fit. Thus, internal representations work out a 
scheme by which perceptions can be identified, new experiences formed 
and a world being looked out for. 
 
That is not only the general perspective but the very detail of every 
day experiences that is formed out in such a scheme: We might select a 
red cup in a dark cellar and recognize it as the identical cup some minutes 
later in bright sunlight. The actual physics of the primary input signal 
have changed completely. This is indicated by side information. That one 
is overlaid to the primary input resulting in the proper identification of 
that cap in different lights. Representations, already in such simple state, 
are no fixed items put into mind. Representations were looked upon 
according to certain internal settings, according to our intentions and 
according to our perspectives. Perceptions were looked upon according 
to certain schemes. Thus, the represented the way we look on them, were 
qualified according to the perspectives chosen. Thus, they found their 
place within a pre-configured set of expectations. Representations were 
seen from within. Accordingly, we can life in a world of changing sensory 
information identifying identities, correlating past and presence. Thus, 
we might recognise the former young friend in the old chap, we look 
upon. That is thinking from within and that may form out at least the 
scheme of such a new type of neuronal aesthetics – and that has a 
                                                                   
5 Already Schopenhauer was arguing about that. 
LOOKING FROM WITHIN. ON THE CONCEPT OF NEURONAL AESTHETICS 
LETTURE 135 






Bexte P. (1999), Blinde Seher. Wahrnehmung von Wahrnehmung in der Kunst des 17. 
Jahrhunderts. Mit einem Anhang zur Entdeckung des Blinden Flecks im Jahre 1668. 
Verl. der Kunst, Amsterdam. 
Braitenberg V., Schüz A. (1998), Cortex: Statistics and Geometry of Neuronal 
Connectivity, Springer, Berlin. 
Breidbach O. (2013), Neuronale Ästhetik. Zur Morpho-Logik des Anschauens, Paderborn, 
München. 
--- Breidbach O. (2012), “Evolution des Kognitiven – Nervenzellen, Sprache und 
kulturelle Adaptationen”, in C. Gansel, D. Vanderbeke, eds., Telling Stories: 
Literature and Evolution/ Geschichten erzählen: Literatur und Evolution Stories: 
Literature and Evolution/ Geschichten erzählen: Literatur und Evolution, De 
Gruyter, Berlin: 121-155. 
--- Breidbach O. (2007), “Neurosemantics, neurons and system theory”, in Theory in 
Biosciences 126: 23-33. 
--- Breidbach, O. (2000); “Neurologik?”, in N. Newen, K. Vogeley (eds.), Selbst und 
Gehirn, Paderborn, Mentis Frankfurt: 353-363. 
--- Breidbach O. (2001), “The Origin and Development of the Neurosciences”, in: P. K. 
Machamer, R. Grush, P. McLaughlin (eds.), Theory and Method in the 
Neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh: 7-29. 
--- Breidbach O. (1999), “Die Innenwelt der Außenwelt – Weltkonstitution im 
Hirngewebe? Zur Konturierung einer Neuronalen Ästhetik”, in O. Breidbach, K. 
Clausberg (eds.), Video ergo sum, Hans-Bredow-Institut., Hamburg: 34-60. 
--- Breidbach O. (1993), Expeditionen ins Innere des Kopfes, TRIAS Thieme Hippokrates 
Enke, Stuttgart. 
Catalanom S.M., Shatz C.J. (1998), “Activity-dependent cortical target selection by 
thalamic axons”, in Science, 281: 559-562 
Finger S. (1994), The Origins of Neuroscience: A History of Explorations into Brain 
Function, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Hagner M. (1997), Homo cerebralis. Der Wandel vom Seelenorgan zum Gehirn, Berlin 
Verlag, Berlin. 
Jamme C., Jeck U.R. (eds.) (2013), Natur und Geist, Fink, München. 
Katz L.C., Shatz C.J. (1996), “Synaptic activity and the construction of cortical circuits”, 
in Science, 274: 1133-1138. 
Majdan M., Shatz C.J. (2006), “Effects of visual experience on activity-dependent gene 
regulation in cortex”, in Nature Neuroscience, 9: 650-659. 
Roth G. (2003), Fühlen, Denken, Handeln. Wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert. 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt. 
Rushton, S.P. (2001), “Applying brain research to create developmentally appropriate 
learning environments”, in Young Children 56: 76-82. 
Voland E., Grammer K. (eds.) (2003), Evolutionary Aesthetics, Springer, Berlin. 
Young D., Lawlor P.A., Leone P., Dragunow M., During M.J. (1999), “Environmental 
enrichment inhibits spontaneous apoptosis, prevents seizures, and is 
neuroprotective”, in Nature Med., 5: 448-453. 
Zeki S., Lamb M. (1994), “The neurology of kinetic art”, in Brain 117: 607-636. 
Olaf BREIDBACH 
 LETTURE 136 
Zeki S. (2002), “Neural Concept Formation & Art. Dante, Michelangelo, Wagner”, in 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 9: 53-76. 
Zeki S. (1993), A Vision of the Brain. Blackwell Scientific Publication, Oxford. 
 
